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International Tax Evasion and Tax Fraud:
Typical Schemes and the Legal Issues
Raised by Their Detection and Prosecution
HUGH SPALL*
During the latter half of the 1970's, the Federal Government
began allocating increased amounts of resources for the investigation
and prosecution of white collar crime.' In response to the increased
attention that these offenses received, legal writers began devoting
attention to the legal issues raised by these types of offenses.' One
category which received attention was the crime of tax fraud. Most
articles, however, discussed issues in a domestic fraud case. The pecu-
liar issues that arise when tax evasion takes on an international char-
acter were largely ignored. 3
The Internal Revenue Service, hereinafter referred to as the
I.R.S., believes that the use of foreign jurisdictions for tax evasion
*Associate Professor of Economics Central Washington University (on leave as a
John M. Olin Fellow at the University of Miami Law and Economics Center), J.D.
1982 University of Miami Law School; member of the Washington Bar.
1. The term "white collar crime" lacks a formal definition. The term was
coined by journalists to cover a gamut of offenses ranging from extortion to securities
fraud. Many of the offenses arise from statutes that regulate economic activity. The
crime can be committed by violating a statute or administrative regulations promul-
gated to enforce the statute. Sometimes a crime is labeled "white collar crime"
because of the accused's identity (businessman or government official) rather than
because of the nature of the offense. The offenses most commonly considered white
collar offenses are: mail and wire fraud, conspiracy, violation of the Travel Act,
conflicts of interest, bribery, extortion, perjury, false statements, defrauding the
government, Medicaid and Medicare fraud, violation of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, RICO offenses, criminal antitrust violations, violations of the Food and
Drug Act, environmental crimes, computer crimes, and, of course, tax fraud. See 18
AM. CalM. L. REV. (1980) (entire issue devoted to white collar crime) and Doramus,
The White Collar Chafes: Looking for Evidence After Indictment, LITIGATION,
Spring 1980, at 16.
2. Note 1, supra. See also, Obermaier, Special Aspects of Litigating White
Collar Criminal Cases, LITIGATION, Spring 1980, at 12. Other examples also exist,
but citation to them would not be helpful.
3. See, e.g., Garbis, Defenses and Discovery in Tax Fraud Investigations, 10
CUM. L. REV. 655 (1980); Dickstein and Forbes, Tax Fraud, 18 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
298 (1980); Feffer and Abrams, Trial of a Criminal Tax Fraud Case: Prosecution and
Defense Perspectives, LITIGATION, Spring 1980, at 19; Smith and Robinson, Tax
Fraud: An Overview for Practitioners, 57 TAxEs 331 (1979); Walter, The Battle for
Information: Strategies of Taxpayers and the I.R.S. to Compel (or Resist) Disclosure,
56 TAxEs 740 (1978). None of these authors discusses the issues raised in this paper.
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purposes has been increasing and shows potential for serious abuse. 4
To counteract this problem, the agency plans to ask Congress for more
resources for the detection and prosecution of this offense.- As a
result, the legal issues present in this type of offense are likely to
appear with greater frequency in the future.
This study addresses the legal issues that are likely to arise in a
prosecution for tax evasion when the evasion scheme makes use of
foreign tax jurisdictions. It is composed of three parts: Part I describes
common tax evasion schemes and the government's methods of prov-
ing the offense in court; Part II describes the investigative techniques
that the I.R.S. uses to detect the crime and to gather evidence for
presentation in court. This part of the study also discusses the legal
issues that may arise during the course of information gathering and
at trial when the evidence is introduced. Part III summarizes Parts I
and II and presents overall conclusions.
I. COMMON TAX FRAUD SCHEMES AND
METHODS OF PROVING THEM
A. Evasion and Fraud in Federal Tax Law
The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between an attempt to
evade or defeat a tax imposed by the code" and the crime of tax
fraud. 7 Although different maximum penalties can be imposed upon
conviction of the two crimes," in practice the courts and practitioners
use the two concepts interchangeably.' Both crimes require a "will-
ful" state of mind,' 0 with "willful" being defined as the intentional
violation of a known legal duty." The major practical distinction
4. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES
TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW: A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL (TAx DivIsiON) AND TH4E ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE TREASURY (TAX POLICY), 3-5,9 (1981).
5. Id. at 10.
6. I.R.C. § 7201 (1976).
7. I.R.C. § 7206 (1976).
8. Compare I.R.C. § 7201 (1976), with I.R.C. § 7206 (1976).
9. H. BALTER, TAX FRAUD AND TAX EVASION, 1.02, at 2-3 (4th ed. 1976 & 1980
Cum. Supp.).
10. id.
11. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976). The government charged the
Pomponio taxpayers with violating section 7206 of the Code (the tax fraud section) in
two ways: (1) by causing their controlled corporation to report payments to the
taxpayers as loans when in fact the payments were dividends, and (2) claiming
partnership losses when the losses were attributable to the corporation. Upon convic-
tion, the taxpayers appealed. The court of appeals reversed because the statute
required the jury to find that the taxpayer had an evil motive and the jury had been
INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION
between the two concepts is that a tax must be due and owing before
one can be guilty of tax evasion, whereas one can be guilty of tax
fraud even if no tax is due and owing.' 2  In most cases, of course,
taxpayers who falsify material matters on tax documents are also
attempting to defeat or evade a tax. Sometimes, however, a taxpayer
with an illegal source of income may be more concerned with conceal-
ing the income source than with evading the tax. A taxpayer with
illegal income may decide that it is easier for the government to
convict him of tax evasion instead of the underlying offense which
gives rise to the income'" and foreclose this line of attack by paying
instructed that motive was irrelevant unless it bore on intent. In a per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that willfulness
required no proof of motive other than an intentional violation of a known duty. Id.
at 12.
12. Compare I.R.C. § 7201, with I.R.C. § 7206 (1976). Section 7201 speaks of an
attempt to defeat a tax whereas section 7206 speaks of falsifying returns and other
documents with respect to a material matter. The section does not speak of a tax due
and owing. Thus, a taxpayer could be guilty of tax fraud if he reported all of his
income but falsified the source of his income.
A taxpayer found himself in this situation in United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d
670 (7th Cir. 1973). The taxpayer reported his income but misstated its source. He
argued that since there was no showing that he had understated his income, he
should not be prosecuted under I.R.C. § 7206 (1) (1976). Instead, he wanted to be
found in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (the false statement statute) because the
statute of limitations barred prosecution for this offense. The district court held that
the taxpayer could be prosecuted under section 7206(1) for falsifying his source of
income even if he had reported the amount earned as this was a material misstate-
ment within the meaning of the statute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court.
13. The conviction of alleged Chicago mobsters Al Capone and Jake Guzik
provide classic examples of this proposition. Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609
(7th Cir. 1931); Guzik v. United States, 54 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1931). Income tax
evasion is easier to prove than other criminal offenses because the corpus of the crime
(a tax due and owing and willfulness) can be proven entirely by circumstantial
evidence. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) provides an excellent illus-
tration. The taxpayers in Holland reported $10,211 of taxable income while their net
worth (assets minus liabilities, both valued at cost) increased by $32,000 during the
taxable year. The government inferred from this evidence that the taxpayers had
unreported income which they used to acquire assets. The taxpayers countered by
claiming that they had accumulated a cash hoard of $104,000 prior to 1933 - the
date that the government had computed their opening net worth. The government
did not introduce evidence which directly contradicted this claim. Instead, it relied
on the inference that anyone with this amount of cash would not have lost their caf6,
lost their furniture, and accumulated unpaid debts of $35,000 in the 1930's. In
addition, the government showed that the taxpayers' income tax returns from 1913 to
1933 did not show enough taxable income to enable the taxpayers to accumulate that
amount of cash. The Court held that the net worth could be used to prove income tax
evasion where opening and closing net worth could be proven with reasonable
certainty, the resulting increase could not be explained by reported taxable income,
the government proves a taxpayer has a source of taxable income, and the underre-
porting of income was willful. Id. at 132, 137-39.
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taxes. While he could accomplish this goal by reporting his income
and claiming his fifth amendment privilege,14 he may be reluctant to
do so for fear of drawing attention to himself. A taxpayer with an
illegal source of income who believes his illegality is not suspected may
decide that reporting his income, but misstating its source, is a partic-
ularly attractive option. For him, as well as for taxpayers who wish to
evade taxes, foreign tax havens offer a singularly attractive opportu-
nity.
B. Tax Havens and Common Tax Evasion Schemes.
The term "tax haven" has numerous definitions. 15  This study
adopts the 1.R.S.'s use of the term. The agency defines a tax haven as a
country characterized by:
(1) tax rates which are lower than the tax rates imposed by the
countries whose residents use the tax havens;
(2) commercial and bank secrecy laws which the jurisdiction
refuses to breach, even when faced with a serious violation of the laws
of another country;
(3) relative importance of banking in the economy;
(4) availability of modern communications facilities;
(5) lack of currency controls on non-residents with respect to
foreign currency; and, in most cases,
(6) aggressive self promotion as a tax haven.16
Based on these criteria, the I.R.S. considers eleven countries tax ha-
vens: the Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Luxem-
bourg-Belgium (trade data for the two countries cannot be separated),
the Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore, and
Switzerland.17
14. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). Sullivan, a bootlegger,
was convicted of failing to file an income tax return. The court of appeals reversed
his conviction, holding that illegal income was taxable but that a recipient of illegal
income was excused from filing a tax return by the fifth amendment. The Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Sullivan was required to file a
return but that he could claim the fifth amendment privilege with respect to any
answers that could incriminate him.
15. For a discussion of these definitions, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Supra
note 4, at 14.
16. Id. at 14-20.
17. Id. at 17 nn.6, 20, 149. The Netherlands is considered to be a tax haven
because her special holding company legislation and network of income tax treaties
facilitate the use of Netherlands companies by third country residents in spite of her
high tax rates.
INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION
The I.R.S. has identified five common patterns of tax evasion
involving the use of tax havens: double trusts, use of secret bank
accounts to hold unreported income, use of controlled foreign corpo-
rations to inflate the expenses or basis of property of a U.S. based
corporation, use of commodities transactions to generate ordinary
losses followed by long term capital gains, and repatriation of untaxed
funds.' Any one of these schemes can be used for tax evasion, tax
fraud, or a combination of both.
The commercial secrecy laws of the tax havens make these
schemes viable by allowing the taxpayer to conceal his ownership
interests in business entities and foreign bank accounts. The Confiden-
tial Relationships (Preservation) Law of the Cayman Islands, for ex-
ample, forbids the disclosure of all corporate information except the
name of the corporation, the date of incorporation, and the registered
office of the corporation.19 The latter can be the office of the corpo-
rate attorney. 2 In Switzerland, the situation is not much better.
Although corporations are subject to extensive public disclosure re-
quirements, ownership interests can be concealed easily through the
use of nominees and bearer shares. 2 In addition, the Swiss penal
code makes information gathering without governmental authoriza-
tion a crime, thus subjecting I.R.S. agents to risk of imprisonment if
they should attempt to gather information without Swiss government
approval.2 2 The United States has two treaties with Switzerland
which pledge cooperation in the investigation of tax crimes, but the
I.R.S. has not found them useful in their enforcement endeavors.
2 3
Without direct access to commercial and bank information re-
garding individual taxpayers who conduct business through tax ha-
vens, the I.R.S. is deprived of investigating many of their tax evasion
and tax avoidance schemes. For example, section 482 authorizing the
I.R.S. to reallocate income among related taxpayers, 24 is a dead letter
if the I.R.S. cannot prove that two taxpayers are related. Section
6038, which requires U.S. controlled foreign corporations to maintain
records reporting income, balance sheets, and transactions with re-
lated entities, 25 cannot be enforced if the I.R.S. cannot find out who
18. Id. at 118-24. The I.R.S. actually identifies eight patterns of tax evasion but
these eight patterns have been condensed into the five patterns listed above.
19. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 198-200.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
25. I.R.C. §§ 6038, 964(c), Treas. Reg. 1.964-3(a)(b).
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controls a foreign corporation. In view of these difficulties, the
I.R.S.'s difficulties in prosecuting tax crimes when the taxpayer uses a
tax haven in his criminal efforts is not surprising. During the period
1978-81, for example, the I.R.S. identified 250 criminal cases involv-
ing offshore transactions, but was forced to forgo prosecution in many
of these because a key element of the case could not be established. 2
Once incorporated behind the shield of the commercial secrecy
laws, a taxpayer can proceed with his illegal schemes. If he wants to
evade taxes, he can buy from the foreign corporation at inflated
prices, reducing his U.S. income, increasing his basis in U.S. property,
and, at the same time, increasing the profits of his foreign subsidiary.
If the taxpayer does not wish to evade taxes, but merely wishes to
conceal an illegal source of income, the foreign corporation can buy
goods from the taxpayer at inflated prices, or it could hire the U.S.
taxpayer as a "consultant." Either activity could provide a legitimate
source for the income that the taxpayer reports to the I.R.S.
These schemes are not foolproof. The I.R.S. has methods of
circumventing the commercial secrecy laws. 7 The use of tax havens,
however, does make the usual methods of proving tax crimes more
difficult to apply.
C. Methods of Proving the Crime
The government has three methods of proving tax evasion: (1)
proving the receipt of specific items of unreported taxable income or
the overstatement of deductions; (2) the net worth-expenditure
method of reconstructing taxable income; and (3) the bank deposit-
cash expenditure method of reconstructing taxable income.2" Any
reasonable method of proof is permissible, but these three methods are
the most common. 29 Each of these methods merits further discussion.
The receipt of specific items of income or the overstatement of
deductions can be proven in a variety of ways. The government can
demonstrate that the taxpayer did not record certain cash receipts.
3 0
26. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 11.
27. See infra text at 338.
28. BALTER, supra note 9, 113.03[3] & [4], at 13-12 to 13-42.
29. Id. 13.03[4][c], at 13-40.
30. Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975) provides a good example.
Shaffer was a dentist who failed to record all of his receipts in his log book. Instead,
these unrecorded receipts were recorded in a second book, called a "cheat book." In
addition, Dr. Shaffer padded his supply expenses and wrote checks for services never
performed. Unfortunately for Dr. Shaffer, he felt compelled to brag about his
exploits to patients and employees. A search warrant was issued, based on the
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Alternatively, if the taxpayer does not receive cash remuneration, the
government can use the concept of economic benefit to demonstrate
that the taxpayer had an unreported taxable event. 31 If a corporation
is involved, the government might prove that the taxpayer engaged in
a sham transaction to disguise a dividend as a non-taxable disburse-
ment-for example, disguising a dividend as a loan.
32
The use of foreign tax havens presents a problem when the I.R.S.
attempts to prove specific items of unreported income or specific
overdeductions. The books of a foreign entity that does no business in
the United States are not subject to administrative summons or grand
jury subpoena unless the entity is controlled by the U.S. taxpayer. 31
Even if they are controlled by a U.S. taxpayer, the government may
be unaware of the true state of control, or if aware of it, unable to
prove the control in an enforcement proceeding.3 4 The government,
therefore, may be unable to prove that a specific expense was ever
incurred because it cannot examine the books of the other firm for a
corresponding receipt entry. Likewise, if proof of control is absent,
the government will be unable to prove the taxpayer is using the
foreign firm to fraudently reassign income.
The net worth method of reconstructing income provides an
alternative to proving tax evasion by showing the omission of specific
items of income or overstatement of deductions. In order to prove tax
evasion by the net worth method, the government must establish:
(1) a reliable net worth at the beginning of the tax year (assets
minus liabilities, both valued at cost);
(2) a reliable net worth at the close of the tax year; and
affidavits of three former employees, and his records and "cheat book" were seized.
Dr. Shaffer was convicted of income tax evasion.
31. Davis v. United States 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), Davis was the sole
owner of a corporation. He took corporate receipts and used them for personal
expenses and investments without reporting them on the corporate books. When he
was indicted on income tax evasion he defended on the ground that the funds would
be taxable income to him only if they were dividends. He argued that the govern-
ment did not prove that the corporation had sufficient earnings and profits to pay a
dividend. The court held that whether the cash represented a dividend was not
relevant. He had received command over property and the enjoyment of an eco-
nomic benefit. Even though creditors of the corporation might be able to attack his
title to the property, he had command over it. Command over property and enjoy-
ment of an economic benefit are a proper base for taxation. Id. at 334-35.
32. For an example of this approach, see supra note 11.
33. See I.R.C. § 7604(a) (1976).
34. See supra notes 19-23, and accompanying text.
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(3) a likely source of taxable income or the negation of all sources
of non-taxable income.35
The opening net worth figure must be proven with reasonable cer-
tainty and the I.R.S. must diligently investigate any leads that the
taxpayer provides which can explain the change in net worth.
3 6
The difference between net worth at the end of the taxable year
and the beginning of the taxable year, plus non-deductible expendi-
tures, plus certain other adjustments, equals the taxpayer's estimated
taxable income.3 7  The difference between estimated taxable income
and reported taxable income equals unreported income. The govern-
ment, of course, must still prove that the understatement of income
was willful.3 8
A reliable opening net worth statement is essential to a net worth
case.3 9  If the taxpayer can demonstrate that the I.R.S. has over-
looked assets or liabilities, then the calculations described in the pre-
vious paragraph are unreliable and the taxpayer can win acquittal.
Practitioners believe that it is not difficult for the I.R.S. to deter-
mine the existence and cost of nearly all the taxpayer's assets except
cash on hand (as distinguished from cash in the bank) as of a given
date.40 Thus, the overlooked cash hoard becomes the classic defense
in a net worth case. If believed at trial, 41 prior accumulated cash
35. BALTER, supra note 9, 13.03[4][a], at 13-14. The net worth method was
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S.
503 (1943). Johnson was a Chicago gambler who reported up to one-half million
dollars of gambling winnings as income. The government was unable to prove that
Johnson had more income than he reported because the gambling houses that he
owned destroyed their records. Instead, the prosecution proved that his expenditures
exceeded his available resources. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain a conviction. In explaining its decision, the Court stated that requiring more
proof than the record disclosed --would be tantamount to holding that skillful con-
cealment is an invincible barrier to proof." Id. at 516-18.
36. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. at 125, 137-38, United States v. Massei,
355 U. S. 595 (1958). Massei answered a question that Holland left unresolved-must
the government show a likely source of taxable income when using the net worth-
expenditures method of proof or can it negate all sources of non-taxable income? The
Court held that the government could negate all sources of non-taxable income. Id.
at 595. The Court's holding was published in a curt per curiam opinion that did not
even bother to report the facts of the case.
37. 348 U.S. at 125. For a numerical illustration of the net worth-expenditures
method of proof, see Plotkin, Government Theories of Tax Fraud: An Analysis of the
Most Used Methods, 37 J. TAX. 211, 213, Exhibit III (Oct. 1972).
38. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. at 139.
39. Id. at 132.
40. BALTER, supra note 9, 13.03[4][a][ii], at 13-18.
41. The conventional wisdom is that the cash hoard defense is usually unsuccess-
ful. Id. 13.02[4][a][ii], at 13-20, 13-21 n.65.
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hoards can destroy the government's net worth calculations. The
government cannot defeat the argument by suggesting that the cash
hoard was accumulated out of unreported income in years not covered
by the indictment because the government must prove tax evasion for
the years stated in the indictment.4 2 A cash hoard which the govern-
ment failed to include in opening net worth, even if accumulated
from the proceeds of tax evasion during a pre-indictment year, would
tend to negate the inference of evasion in the years covered by the
indictment.
The previous paragraph describes the typical issues that arise in a
domestic evasion case when the government uses the net worth
method of proving evasion. As indicated, the government's major
problem is establishing opening net worth, and in particular, negating
the suggestion that it has failed to account for large sums of cash in the
taxpayer's possession at the beginning of the tax year. When a tax-
payer uses a tax haven in his evasion scheme, however, the govern-
ment's major problem is different. In this type of case, the govern-
ment's major proof problem is the taxpayer's net worth at the close of
the tax year. An example may make the problem clear.
A typical tax evasion scheme involves surreptitiously removing
untaxed income from the United States and depositing it in a tax
haven.43 A taxpayer is supposed to report his foreign bank holdings
at tax time, 44 but of course, a tax evader will not. The deposit becomes
security for a loan from the receiving bank or some other bank within
the tax haven. The loan is then used to purchase assets in the United
States or in some other country. If the taxpayer is investigated by the
I.R.S., the taxpayer explains that he has been able to acquire his
additional assets because he has obtained a bank loan. Both the bank
and the taxpayer claim the bank loan is a signature loan, not a secured
loan. Because of the bank secrecy laws in the tax haven, the I.R.S. is
unable to prove otherwise. Since the government is unable to prove
the taxpayer's net worth at the close of the tax year is higher than at
the beginning of the year, the government cannot prosecute.
45
This fact pattern is similar to the fact pattern occurring in X v.
Eidgendssische Steuerverwaltung,46 a famous Swiss banking case.
42. id. 113.02[3], at 13-13.
43. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 116.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970), 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1977).
45. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 116.
46. BGE 961737 (Dec. 23, 1970); 2 CCH TAX TREATIES, New Developments,
9795 (June 28, 1971).
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Only an excerpt of the case has been reported. According to the
private publication of a Swiss scholar, the facts can be summarized as
follows: 47 X, who was domiciled in the United States, sent funds from
his untaxed earnings to a Swiss bank. The bank made a loan to X who
repaid the loan and deducted the interest from his U.S. income tax.
After repayment of the loan, the bank repaid the interest plus the
principal to X (probably as a refund of X's original deposit). The
government requested information about X's transaction with the
bank under the 1951 tax treaty between the two countries and the
request was granted. 48 The victory was hollow, however, for Switz-
erland does not transmit information to the United States in a form
which makes it admissible in U.S. criminal proceedings. 49  Thus,
unless the information was useful in locating other evidence, the
government's victory accomplished very little.
The United States has two treaties with Switzerland in which the
nations pledge to cooperate in tax investigations. The first is an in-
come tax treaty, ratified in 1951. The second is a mutual assistance
treaty in criminal matters, which became effective in 1973. When X
arose, the 1973 treaty was not in existence. The outcome, however,
would probably have been the same under the 1973 treaty as under
the 1951 treaty. The 1973 treaty offers little, if any improvement over
the 1951 treaty. 50  The limited usefulness of these treaties is not un-
usual. In the I.R.S.'s experiences, tax treaties with other countries
have not been helpful in criminal tax investigations. 51
The previous discussion suggests that the I.R.S. has difficulty
proving tax evasion by using the net worth-expenditures method of
reconstructing income when the taxpayer makes use of tax havens to
conceal his financial transactions. The root of the problem consists of
obtaining an accurate estimate of the taxpayer's foreign assets in a
form admissible in U.S. courts. In a net worth case, the usual ap-
proach is to have the taxpayer stipulate or admit to his initial net
47. Kronauer, Information Given for Tax Purposes from Switzerland to Foreign
Countries Especially to the United States for the Prevention of Fraud or the Like in
Relation to Certain American Taxes, 30 TAx L. REV. 47, 70-71 (1974), summarizing
HOEHN, IN DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKCEHAMNIS, BANKWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FORSCHUNGEN
BAND 10, at 39 (1972).
48. Id. at 70-71.
49. Id. at 75; Abrams, Tax Evasion and Swiss Banking Secrecy, PRACTICAL LAW,
June 1, 1978, at 77, 81; Switzer, Exchange of Information Articles. 26 Can. Tax. I.
306, 311 (1978).
50. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 210; Abrams, supra note 49, at
82.
51. Id. at 208.
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worth.5" The I.R.S. then estimates expenditures and closing net
worth by examining public records, bank records, and obtaining ad-
missions. The taxpayer, however, does not have to make statements to
the I.R.S. He can invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination, forcing the I.R.S. to rely on the unprivileged informa-
tion that it can gather through summons, subpoenas, and search
warrants,53 further increasing the government's evidence problems.
Practitioners believe that the probability of successfully defend-
ing a tax evasion charge largely depends on how successfully the
taxpayer can assert his fifth amendment privilege. 54 Some of the most
damaging evidence presented in court is information that the defend-
ant provided but did not have to provide~5 The secrecy laws of tax
havens will not protect the taxpayer if the I.R.S. can convince a
taxpayer using a tax haven to stipulate to his net worth or foreign
liabilities. One wonders, however, whether a taxpayer, who is sophis-
ticated enough to use a tax haven for tax evasion purposes, will
voluntarily provide information about his assets and liabilities.
Tax havens place obstacles in the path of the I.R.S. when it
attempts to use the net worth method of proving tax evasion, espe-
cially when the I.R.S. attempts to use the bank deposits method of
proof. There are three requirements for a bank deposit case: (1) a
going business to explain the source of the reconstructed income; (2)
periodic deposits-reasoned to be the result of a going business; and
(3) an adjustment of deposits to reflect current income only.5 6
The adjustment to deposits occurs as follows: 57 first, deduct items
of a non-income nature (e.g., loans) to estimate the component of
deposits reflecting income, and then add known cash expenditures not
reflected in deposits. The sum of net deposits plus known cash expend-
itures equals estimated gross income. Next, subtract deductible busi-
ness expenses and add cash item expenses from the estimated gross
income. The resulting figure is estimated adjusted gross income. This
52. BALTEM, supra note 9, 13 .0 3 [4][a][iil, at 13-20 n.64; Feffers and Abrams,
supra note 3, at 19.
53. For a discussion of the issues raised by summons, subpoenas, and search
warrants in domestic tax fraud cases, see Garbis, supra note 3 and Notes: Discovery
in the IRS Summons Enjorcement Proceeding: Less Certain Than Death and Taxes,
31 U. FLA. L. REV. 321 (1979).
54. See Garbis, supra note 3, at 655-56; Feffers and Abrams, supra note 3, at 19;
Smith and Robinson, supra note 3, at 331.
55. Id.
56. BALTER, supra note 9, 13.03[4][b], at 13-39.
57. Plotkin, supra note 37, at 212.
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figure can be compared to the figure the taxpayer reported to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer has concealed income.51
The bank deposits-cash expenditure method of reconstructing
income suffers from many of the same difficulties as the net worth
method when the taxpayer uses a foreign tax haven. Unless the tax-
payer cooperates with the I.R.S., and honestly reports his initial level
of assets and liabilities, the Service cannot be certain that it has netted
all items of a non-income nature out of the taxpayer's bank deposits. A
taxpayer might willingly report a loan from a foreign bank to explain
a deposit, "forgetting" to mention that it is secured by a bank deposit
that he has spirited out of the country. Unless the I.R.S. can penetrate
the tax haven's bank secrecy laws, the government may be unable to
prove tax evasion at trial.
II. METHODS OF OBTAINING EVIDENCE ABROAD
The I.R.S. has five methods of obtaining evidence for use in tax
trials: (1) voluntary cooperation of the taxpayer; (2) compulsory proc-
ess; (3) search warrants; (4) tax treaties; and (5) covert operations. 59
Methods one and three, voluntary cooperation and search warrants,
do not raise unusual legal issues when evasion or fraud take on an
international character. The remaining three techniques, compulsory
process, exchange of information treaties, and covert operations, raise
issues which are not likely to appear in a domestic tax evasion case.
A. Compulsory Process
Compulsory process can take one of three forms: (1) an I.R.S.
summons, (2) a grand jury subpoena, and (3) letters rogatory.
(1) The Summons
The I.R.S. can issue an administrative summons ordering a tax-
payer or third party record keeper to produce his books and records
for examination. 0 When the taxpayer or record keeper receives the
summons, he has several options: (1) he can refuse to appear; (2) he
can appear and refuse to produce his books and records, stating his
reasons for refusing; 6 ' or (3) he can comply.
58. For a numerical example, see id., Exhibit II.
59. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra, at 180-210.
60. I.R.C. § 7602 (1976).
61. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
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If the summons recipient refuses to appear, he can be fined, or
imprisoned, or both. 2 These sanctions, however, cannot be imposed
without a court order.8 3  The statute providing venue for such an
action fails to provide venue for a person or business domiciled outside
of the United States.6 4  Thus, an action cannot be taken against a
taxpayer or record keeper until he enters the United States unless the
summons recipient is a U.S. citizen and the government chooses to
proceed against him by grand jury subpoena. 6s Once within the
jurisdiction of a district court, however, contempt proceedings could
be initiated. Given the language of 7210, the summons recipient
would probably be held in contempt for failure to appear in response
to the summons. 66 If the summons recipient is a third party record
keeper who does not anticipate ever entering the jurisdiction of a U.S.
district court, this sanction is probably insufficient to force compli-
ance with the statute. If he does not fall into this category, however,
his wisest course of action is to appear. A summons recipient will not
be held in contempt if he appears before the I.R.S. and refuses to
produce his books and records, giving a good faith reason for doing
so. 6 7 If he appears and refuses to produce the required information,
the I.R.S. must seek an order to compel production from the U.S.
district court .6  At the hearing, which is an adversarial proceeding,
the taxpayer can litigate his challenge to the summons.6" After hearing
62. I.R.C. § 7210 (1976).
63. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 446-48.
64. I.R.C. §§ 7402(b) (1976), 7604(a) (1976). See United States v. Hankins, 581
F.2d 431, 438 n. 11 (1978). Hankins was an attorney who was ordered to testify about
the tax affairs of one of his clients by the district court. On appeal, he challenged the
jurisdiction of the district court, arguing that 7402(b) only gave jurisdiction to the
court sitting in the district where the taxpayer resided or was found. The court
rejected his argument, holding that section 7402(b) was a venue provision and that
the attorney had waived his objection by not raising it in district court.
65. The I.R.S., however, can circumvent this limitation on its summons power
by submitting the matter to a grand jury who can issue a subpoena. 28 U.S.C. § 1783
(1976). The constitutionality of subpoenaing U.S. citizens residing abroad was up-
held in United States v. Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). Blackmer was a U.S. citizen
who fled abroad to avoid testifying in the Teapot Dome Scandal. In order to force
testimony from the scandal's participants, Congress passed the Walsh Act, currently
28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976). The constitutionality of the Walsh Act was upheld in the
Blackmer case. For a history of the subpoena power over U.S. citizens abroad, see
Gallagher, Subpoena Service on Citizens Residing Abroad: A Proposal for the Adop-
tion of an International Approach in Criminal Proceedings, 12 INT'L LAW. 563
(1978).
66. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 446-47; I.R.C. § 7210 (1976).
67. Reisman, 375 U.S. at 447.
68. Id. at 445-46.
69. Id. at 449.
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argument, the court orders production on pain of contempt or quashes
the summons.
In challenging a summons, the summonee can claim four de-
fenses: (1) the requested information is not relevant; (2) compliance
would violate his fourth and fifth amendment rights; (3) the informa-
tion is privileged; or (4) that the summons has been issued for an
improper purpose.70 These issues have been litigated extensively
where domestic evasion and fraud are involved, and therefore will not
be discussed here. 71 When tax evasion occurs with the help of a tax
haven, however, an I.R.S. summons can raise issues which do not
occur in a domestic tax case. These issues will be discussed here.
Suppose that a summons recipient controls a foreign subsidiary,
and further, that the I.R.S. issues a summons which orders him to
produce the subsidiary's records for an audit. Next, assume the subsid-
iary is located in a jurisdiction with a commercial secrecy law and
local law makes revelation of these records a crime. Can the taxpayer
refuse to surrender records on the grounds that doing so will subject
him to criminal sanctions in the foreign country?
Most of the litigation concerning the effect of foreign law on the
production of business records occurs because a party to a private civil
lawsuit fails to comply with discovery order. There is one case where
compliance with an I.R.S. summons was litigated - First National
City Bank of New York v. IRS.7 2 This case involved a summons to a
third party record keeper, but the rationale would seem to apply
equally to the summonee in our example. In this case, the I.R.S.
served a summons on Citibank at its New York office calling on
Citibank to produce all relevant records, wherever held, relating to
the accounts of a corporate customer of the bank. 73 The bank pro-
duced its New York records but refused to produce records physically
located in Panama, claiming that to do so would violate Panamanian
law and established principles of international comity."4 The district
court modified the summons and ordered production of local records
only. 75 The Second Circuit found the evidence insufficient to estab-
lish that production of the records would violate Panamanian law and
reversed, ordering reinstatement of the original summons . 7  The
70. Id.
71. See supra note 53.
72. 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
73. Id. at 618.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 619-20.
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court stated in dicta, however, that production of the records should
not be ordered if it would violate Panamanian law.
77
Whether First National City Bank of New York is still good law is
doubtful. A summons is enforced by a court order to produce docu-
ments, in effect by a subpoena. The case law gives mixed results when
third party record holders have had their records subpoenaed and
refused to comply because compliance would violate foreign law. In
general, however, the more recent case law seems to indicate that the
subpoena will be enforced.
(2) Subpoenas
Three years after First National City Bank of New York was
decided, the Panamanian secrecy law became an issue again.78 A
grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecurn for the records of bank
accounts of four individuals and one corporation.7 9 In this case, the
bank was able to demonstrate that compliance with the subpoena
would violate Panamanian law.80 Although the violation would be
equivalent to a misdemeanor, the district court refused to order Chase
to produce the records held by its Panamanian branch. The Second
Circuit affirmed.8 '
The decision of the Second Circuit was criticized as inconsistent
with Societe Internationale v. Rogers,82 a United States Supreme
Court case.83 In Societe Internationale, the Court distinguished the
power to order production of records from the due process limitations
on the penalty that could be imposed for failure to obey a production
order. Societe Internationale arose under the Trading with the Enemy
Act. Societ6 Internationale, a Swiss company, petitioned for the re-
turn of property seized during World War II. The district court
ordered the company to produce certain records as part of discov-
ery. 84 The firm did not produce them, claiming that their production
would violate Swiss law and that the Swiss Federal Attorney had
issued an order prohibiting their release. 85  The district court dis-
77. Id. at 619.
78. In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
79. id. at 611-12.
80. Id. at 613.
81. Id. at 612-13.
82. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
83. Note: Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation:
Recent Developments in the Law Concerning Illegality Excuse for Non-Production,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 752-55 (1974).
84. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 200.
85. Id. at 200-01.
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missed the complaint for failure to comply with discovery and the
D.C. Circuit affirmed.18 The Supreme Court reversed.1
7
In arriving at its decision, the Court noted that the case presented
two issues: (1) Did the court have the power to order production of
documents when to do so would violate the laws of another sover-
eign?8 s (2) Should the court have dismissed the complaint for failure
to comply with the order?8 9 The first question was answered in the
affirmative; the Court answered the second question in the negative.
In explaining its decision the Court stated:
We think that a party "refuses to obey" simply by failing to comply
with an order. So construed the Rule allows a court all the flexibil-
ity it might need in framing an order appropriate to a particular
situation. Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the
production order. Such reasons and the willfulness or good faith of
petitioner can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are
relevant only to the path which the District Court might follow in
dealing with petitioner's failure to comply . . . (emphasis added).
The provisions of Rule 37 which are here involved must be
read in light of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law. . . . Certainly substantial constitutional questions are pro-
voked by such action . . . petitioner's failure to satisfy fully the
requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered
neither by its own conduct not by circumstances within its control.
It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened
because the laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign
sovereign ...
It does not claim that Swiss laws protecting banking records
should here be enforced. It explicitly recognizes that it is subject to
procedural rules of United States courts in this litigation and has
made full effort to follow these rules. It asserts no immunity from
them. It asserts only its inability to comply because of foreign law.
In view of the findings in this case, the position in which
petitioner stands in this litigation, and the serious constitutional
questions we have noted, we think that Rule 37 should not be
construed to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of peti-
86. Id, at 203.
87. Id. at 213.
88. Id. at 204.
89. Id. at 206.
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tioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it
has been established that failure to comply has been due to inabil-
ity, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner. °0
Societj Internationale is a case interpeting the discovery rules of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is not a case in which a party
was held in contempt for failing to obey an I.R.S. summons or a grand
jury subpoena. A discovery order, however, is an order to produce
information, as is a grand jury subpoena or a court order to comply
with an I.R.S. summons. Societi Internationale, therefore, may have
application to grand jury subpoenas and court orders to comply with
I. R.S. summonses. Societ Internationale suggests that courts have the
power to order production of records when the production would
violate foreign law, but that due process may require the court to
forgo sanctions if the recipient of the order makes a good faith effort to
comply (e.g., seeks permission from the foreign government to com-
ply), but cannot do so without incurring criminal sanctions in the
foreign jurisdiction.
This same issue was addressed seven years later in sections 39 and
40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES. These sections state:
Section 39
Inconsistent Requirements Do Not Affect Jurisdiction.
(1) A state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule
of law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely be-
cause such exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subject-
ing him to liability under the law of another state having jurisdic-
tion with respect to that conduct.
(2) Factors to be considered in minimizing conflicts arising
from the application of the rule stated in subsection (1) with respect
to enforcement jurisdiction are stated in Section 40.
Section 40
Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction.
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce
rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent
conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by inter-
national law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital
national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature
of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose
90. Id. at 208-12.
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upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to
take place in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of
the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with
the rule prescribed by that state.9l
Shortly thereafter, courts began applying sections 39 and 40
when the objects of the subpoenas and court orders claimed that
compliance would place them in violation of foreign laws.
9 2
Sections 39 and 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) have been
applied only once in a tax evasion case-In re United States v. Field."3
In this case, a bank official from Grand Cayman refused to answer
questions before a grand jury investigating income tax evasion. 4 The
district court held him in contempt and he appealed, claiming that
the act of testifying would subject him to criminal sanctions in the
Grand Caymans for violating the bank secrecy laws. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, in affirming the contempt citation, applied section 40 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), but completely ignored factor (b)-the hard-
ship imposed on the individual by enforcement. 5 One commentator
has criticized the court for failing to consider this factor,9" but argued
that its consideration would not have changed the result. 9
The commentator is probably correct, although he does not offer
a detailed explanation of his conclusion. In passing, he suggests that
the penalty imposed on an individual will not preclude enforcement
when significant state interests are involved. 9 He does not, however,
specify the "significant interests" at stake.
Political issues of enormous significance are at stake. The Federal
Government channels billions of dollars of revenue to finance "social
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, §§ 39, 40 (1965).
92. This approach is currently being used. See In re Westinghouse Uranium
Contracts, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (discovery order in a breach of contract
action); In re United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (grand jury
subpoena in a tax evasion case); In re United States v. First National City Bank, 396
F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (subpoena duces tecum issued pursuant to an antitrust
investigation).
93, 532 F.2d at 407.
94. Id. at 405.
95. See id. at 407-09.
96. Note: United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976)-Alien's Fifth
Amendment and International Law Defenses Held Invalid Before Federal Grand
Jury Investigating Tax Evasion Schemes Involving Foreign Banks, 30 TAx LAW. 470
(1977).
97. Id. at 476-77.
98. Id. at 476.
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programs" (a euphemism for income redistribution). As explained in
Part I of this study, tax havens provide an opportunity to evade being
taxed. The bank secrecy laws of the tax havens play an indispensable
role in this process. To allow those laws to provide an excuse for
awarding compulsory process in a tax evasion case is to decide that
those with income derived from money capital cannot be taxed. Since
this category of taxpayer includes a large number of individuals, a
decision to respect foreign bank secrecy laws would ultimately result
in the necessity of choosing between the following options: (1) reduced
social spending, or (2) replacement or supplementation of the income
tax with some form of tax that cannot be evaded by transferring funds
to tax havens (e.g., a sales tax). To present the Federal Government
with that set of options would touch off vicious political warfare,
something U.S. courts have not been willing to do since 1935.
Under these circumstances, due process considerations will yield.
In Societ Internationale, the United States Supreme Court faced this
issue much more forthrightly than the Fifth Circuit did in Field. The
Supreme Court recognized that serious due process questions were
involved. 99 By forcing the corporation to produce records in Switzer-
land, the record keeper was placed in danger of having the corpora-
tion's Swiss property confiscated. The court refused to subject the
corporation to a risk of loss of property. In contrast, the Field court
was willing to subject an individual to a risk of loss of liberty. The
countervailing state interest in Field was stronger than in Societ
Internationale, but what is significant is that the Field court never
considered the due process rights of the individual. The Fifth Circuit's
sole reference to the fifth amendment was a statement that the
amendment did not apply because the act of testifying put the official
in danger of criminal sanctions, not the content of his answers. 00
The fifth amendment, however, also states: "No person should. . . be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law ... "101 Thus, there was a serious fifth amendment issue that
the court did not face.
Although the Field decision is not compatible with that of Societd
Internationale, it is in the spirit of recent criminal tax evasion cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court. 0 2 In United States v.
LaSalle National Bank, the Court held that the I.R.S. could issue a
99. 357 U.S. at 210-211.
100. 532 F.2d at 406-07.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978);
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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summons to a trustee of property compelling the production of books
and papers over the taxpayer's objections after an I.R.S. special agent
had decided to recommend criminal prosecution of the taxpayer. 1
3
The Court explained that the civil and criminal aspects of the Internal
Revenue Code were inseparably intertwined and that the government
does not abandon its interest in unpaid taxes merely because a crimi-
nal prosecution has begun. The Court stated: "Logically, . . ., the
I.R.S. could use its summons authority under section 7602 to uncover
information about the tax liability created by a fraud regardless of the
status of the criminal case."1 0 4 The Court stated further that the only
limits on the summons power are the limits that Congress imposes by
statute. O-
United States v. Payner is in keeping with the spirit of LaSalle. In
the Payner case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction against a
third party based on evidence derived from a theft committed by an
I.R.S. informant against a Bahamian bank official.' 0 6  The Court
held that the defendant lacked standing to suppress the evidence
under the fourth amendment and under the Court's general supervi-
sory power because he was not the thief's victim.1 0 7
LaSalle National Bank and Payner are consistent with the Court's
general approach to tax evasion cases. The Court has been quite
candid about the way that it approaches evasion cases. In United
States v. Bisceglia,'°8 the Court stated, "we recognize that the author-
ity vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to
abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to
undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system . .."I9 (emphasis
added). In Donaldson v. United States," '0 the Court, speaking of the
use of the summons power, stated, "to draw a line where a special
agent appears would require the Service, in a situation of suspected
but undetermined fraud, to forego either the use of the summons or
the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for prosecution. "We
refuse to draw the line and thus to stultify enforcement of federal
law""' (emphasis added). The Court cited the Donaldson language
103. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. at 300-05, 313-15.
104. Id. at 312.
105. Id. at 311-12.
106. Payner, 447 U.S. at 730, 735-36.
107. Id. at 731-32, 735-36.
108. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
109. Id. at 146.
110. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
111. Id. at 535-36.
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two years later in Couch v. United States. 112 In United States v.
Powell, the Court held that probable cause was not necessary to issue
an I.R.S. summons, stating "... we reject such an interpretation
because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out
investigations he thinks warranted . . . ""3 (emphasis added).
Upjohn Company v. United States114 provides the only recent
example where the Supreme Court has sided with the taxpayer in a
contest over the I.R.S.'s power to compel the production of informa-
tion. In Upjohn, the I.R.S. attempted to acquire questionnaires,
notes, and memoranda compiled by corporate attorneys who were
investigating whether the firm's employees had bribed foreign offi-
cials." 5 The Court held that the records were protected by the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. " 6 It should
be noted, however, that the taxpayer was not attempting to defeat a
tax evasion indictment. Upjohn voluntarily reported the payments to
the I.R.S. and gave the agency a list of the people interviewed by
corporate counsel." 7 Thus, the ability of the I.R.S. to enforce the
law was not at issue. The decision, therefore, does not represent a
departure from the Court's apparent policy of giving the I.R.S. a free
hand to enforce the tax laws.
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether due
process is violated by punishing a foreign bank official or corporate
officer for refusing to testify about the activities of a U.S. taxpayer
before a grand jury when such testimony might subject him to crimi-
nal prosecution in his own country. The Court's decision in Societd
Internationale suggests that they would give the issue serious consider-
ation. Given the approach taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), how-
ever, and the government's need for revenue, the Court would proba-
bly decide that due process was not violated. If Field had appealed,
the Court would probably have upheld the Fifth Circuit.
(3) Letters Rogatory
Letters rogatory are requests for assistance from a court to a
foreign government, usually in the form of written rogatories." 8 The
112. 409 U.S. 322, 326 (1973).
113. 379 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1964).
114. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
115. Id. at 387-88.
116. Id. at 389-91, 396-97.
117. Id. at 387, 396.
118. Doramus, supra note 1, at 18.
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interrogatories are filed with the district court along with a motion for
their issuance."" If granted, they are translated, and sent to the
foreign country through diplomatic channels to the other country's
foreign ministry.12 0  If the other country cooperates, its courts sum-
mon the witness and obtain answers to the interrogatories under
oath.' 2' The answers are returned through the same channels that
they were sent.1
22
Letters rogatory are not used frequently in tax cases. 23  The
I.R.S. avoids using them because of excessive turn around time, from
three months to a year, and because the decision to grant assistance is
completely within the discretion of foreign authorities. 12 4
C. Tax Treaties
United States tax treaties in force contain an article obligating
both countries to exchange information on matters relating to tax
administration. 125 The United States currently has over thirty income
tax treaties in force, including some with nations generally considered
to be tax havens. 26 Nevertheless, the utility of this treaty network is
limited. 'Lhe United States has no treaty with the Bahamas, Bermuda,
the Caymans or Panama. 27 Where a treaty exists, the treaty partner
is obligated to give only that information obtainable under local
law. 38 If a country has a commercial secrecy law, for example,
corporate ownership information will not be obtainable. Also, a
treaty partner might not be obligated to perform actions that the
United States cannot perform. 129  Suppose, for example, that the
I.R.S. has recommended prosecution to the Department of Justice.
Under the LaSalle decision, the agency can no longer use the adminis-
trative summons to gather information. 13 0 Under the tax treaties, the
treaty partner might not be obligated to use its administrative process
to help the I.R.S.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 205.
124. Id. at 205.
125. Id. at 207.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 208.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. at 311-13.
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Although U.S. tax treaties contain articles providing for an ex-
change of administrative information, only one treaty exists where the
United States and its treaty partner agree to lend mutual assistance to
each other in criminal cases. This treaty is with Switzerland, an
important tax haven.' 31 The I.R.S., however, reports that the treaty
has not been useful because: (1) the treaty is limited to criminal
matters; (2) the treaty applies to tax crimes only if the subject of the
investigation is an organized crime figure; and (3) under Swiss imple-
menting legislation, the subject of the investigation can contest the
taking of authenticated testimony, delaying production of testimony
for up to one year.
32
If an organized crime figure is not the subject of the investiga-
tion, the Swiss mutual assistance treaty cannot be invoked, 3 3 and the
I.R.S. has to proceed under article 16 of the 1951 treaty. 34 Accord-
ing to a leading Swiss scholar, the 1951 treaty has four defects which
limit its usefulness in tax fraud matters: 13-
(1) the United States must prove a sufficient basis for suspicion of
tax fraud "or the like" to get information from Switzerland, but
such proof is often unavailable without Swiss information;
131. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 209. See 12 I.L.M. 916 (1973)
for the text of the treaty. Thirty-five crimes are covered by the treaty.
132. Id. at 210.
133. Id. at 210; Abrams, supra note 49, at 82.
134. (1) The competent authorities of the contracting States shall exchange
such information (being information available under the respective taxa-
tion laws of the contracting States) as is necessary for carrying out the
provisions of the present Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the
like in relation to the taxes which are the subject of the present Conven-
tion. Any information so exchanged shall be treated as secret and shall not
be disclosed to any person other than those concerned with the assessment
and collection of the taxes which are the subject of the present Conven-
tion. No information shall be exchanged which would disclose any trade,
business, industrial or professional secret or any trade process.
(2) [Not relevant because it concerns the collection of taxes.]
(3) In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to
impose upon either of the contracting States the obligation to carry out
administrative measures at variance with the regulations and practice of
either contracting State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty,
security or public policy or to supply particulars which are not procurable
under its own legislation or that of the State making application.
Quoted in Kronauer, supra note 47, at 71.
Paragraph 2 of article I1 of the income tax treaty provides: "In the applica-
tion of the provisions of the present Convention by one of the contracting
States any term not otherwise defined shall, unless the context otherwise
requires, have the meaning which such term has under its own tax laws."
Quoted in id. at 79 n.128.
135. Id. at 78, 79, 81, 82, 85.
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(2) the term tax fraud is undefined so the term in Switzerland is
given its Swiss law meaning. Under local law, tax fraud is using
legal documents (but not tax returns) to obtain an illegal tax
advantage;
(3) Swiss law limits the duty of third party, record keepers to
disclose documents. Although the Swiss government can re-
quest disclosure through the owners of the documents, the
taxpayer has the option of paying a fine instead of disclosing
them;
(4) the information is not provided in a form that is admissible in
U.S. courts.
The 1951 and 1973 treaties raise some interesting issues. First,
must the I.R.S. forgo use of the administrative summons if it requests
Swiss assistance under the Swiss treaties? The LaSalle court stated that
the I.R.S. could not use its summons authority if it had made a
committment in an institutional sense, to prosecute.13 6  The 1973
treaty does not authorize the release of any information except that
which will contribute substantially to a conviction.1 3 7  The same
problem seems to be present under the 1951 treaty. The United States,
according to Swiss interpretation of the treaty, has agreed to use the
information it receives only in tax fraud cases.13 As a result, the
target of the investigation could argue that the request for information
under the treaty shows that the agency has abandoned any intent to
proceed in a civil action against the taxpayer. If the courts accept this
argument, a request for information under the treaties would require
the I.R.S. to forgo the use of the summons.
Whether this argument will be successful is not clear. The I.R.S.
could argue that a request for information does not mean that it has
made an institutional commitment to prosecute because the treaty
does not obligate it to use the information. Given the reluctance of the
Supreme Court to impede I.R.S. enforcement of the tax laws, 3 3 the
argument might succeed. As the Court points out, however, the same
argument could be made after the I.R.S. recommends prosecution to
the Department of Justice (the Court's own cutoff point for use of the
administrative summons). 4  At stake is the interpretation of section
136. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. at 316.
137. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 210.
138. Kronauer, supra note 47, at 96.
139. See injra text at 354.
140. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 312-13 & n. 15.
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7602, and the Court has said that Congress intended no broader
authority.141 Thus, the Court might go the other way, although the
author personally doubts this.
The second issue which might arise under the Swiss treaties is
whether information gathered under the treaty can be used in a civil
case. The treaty permits gathering information for criminal uses, not
for civil uses. Since a treaty is the law of the land, 142 use of the
information in a civil trial might be barred.
Two obstacles to using the treaty to suppress evidence in a civil
case stand in the taxpayer's path. First, does a taxpayer have standing
to challenge a treaty violation by the U.S. government? Second, can
the taxpayer claim the benefit of the treaty after United States v.
Janis?
The taxpayer should have standing. The first criteria of standing,
a personal stake in the outcome, is satisfied. The second criteria, an
interest within the zone of interests protected by the treaty, 143 also
seems satisfied. The taxpayer in a civil case falls within the zone of
interests that the treaty is designed to protect (i.e., non-criminal
commercial and banking interests in the signatory nations).
The issue of whether the taxpayer can prevent the government
from using tax information obtained under the Swiss treaty in a civil
trial is a close question under the lanis case. The use of such informa-
tion would violate a treaty and treaties have the force of law. In Janis,
however, the United States Supreme Court permitted evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to be used
in a civil tax case. 44  Does Janis mean that the taxpayer cannot
suppress evidence in a civil trial if the government seeks to use it in
violation of a treaty that it has not renounced? The answer to this
question should be no. To understand why, a knowledge of the Janis
fact pattern is necessary.
In Janis, local police raided a bookkeeping establishment, seizing
records with an invalid warrant. 45 The police turned the records
over to the I.R.S. who assessed back wagering taxes on the bookie. 4 1
141. Id.
142. "... all treaties made, or which shall be made; under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ..." U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
143. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150 (1970).
144. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
145. Id. at 436, 438.
146. Id. at 437.
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The taxpayer paid and then sued for refund. 47 Both parties stipu-
lated that the civil tax assessment was based solely on the illegally
seized items and information supplied by the officer who obtained the
warrant. 148  The Supreme Court framed the issue as follows: "Is
evidence seized by a state criminal law enforcement officer in good
faith, but nonetheless unconstitutionally, inadmissible in a civil pro-
ceeding by or against the United States?" 149
The Court held that the evidence was admissible. 150 In explain-
ing its decision, the Court stated that "the prime purpose of the
[exclusionary] rule, if not its sole purpose," is to deter police miscon-
duct.' 5' The Court reasoned that the deterrence function had already
been performed when the evidence was excluded in the state criminal
trial. 152  Exclusion in a civil tax trial would have little additional
deterrent effect and would hamper enforcement of a valid law.153
The taxpayer can probably suppress the evidence obtained in
violation of a treaty in a civil tax trial in spite of Janis. The Janis court
permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence because local police
would not be deterred from illegal activity by the possibility that the
evidence seized would be suppressed in a federal civil tax trial. 154 The
Court implied that the result would have been different if federal
agents had seized the evidence. 55 Thus, the Court would probably
agree that suppression serves the policy of deterrence when federal tax
authorities seek to use evidence obtained for tax purposes in a tax trial
in violation of a law (treaty) governing the use of that information.
A final issue which could arise under the Swiss treaty (or under
any tax treaty) is the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence
seized in violation of the taxpayer's fourth and fifth amendment
rights. Suppose a foreign official seizes evidence in a manner which
complies with the law of his own government, but the seizure does not
comply with the Constitution of the United States. Assuming that the
courts cannot avoid the issue by finding a lack of standing, 156 is the
evidence admissible in U.S. courts?
147. Id. at 438.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 434.
150. Id. at 454.
151. Id. at 446.
152. Id. at 448.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 447, 453-54.
155. Id.
156. See the discussion of United States v. Payner, inJra text at 355.
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The issue has not yet arisen. There are non-tax cases, however,
where foreign authorities have seized evidence in violation of the
accused's fourth and fifth amendment rights and turned the evidence
over to U.S. authorities. The general rule for fourth amendment
violations under these circumstances can be stated as follows: the
evidence is admissible as long as foreign authorities are not acting as
agents for U.S. authorities, U.S. authorities do not participate in the
search, and the violation which occurs at the hands of foreign officials
is not so outrageous as to require suppression under the Court's gen-
eral supervisory powers over the justice system.157
Whether foreign authorities are acting as agents of the U.S.
government is a question of fact. 158 If the sole purpose for conducting
the search was to obtain information for the U.S. government, and
the search violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights, the
evidence must be suppressed.1'5 If the person conducting the search
had motives other than helping the U.S. government, evidence seized
in an illegal search is admissible. 160 Merely providing information to
157. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976) (warrantless search by
Canadian police in a securities fraud case), United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257
(7th Cir. 1976) (arrest without probable cause and illegal search under U.S. law by
Canadian authorities of suspects in a $3,000,000 theft); United States v. Cotroni, 527
F.2d 708 (2nd Cir. 1975) (wiretap without judicial authorization by Canadian
authorities in a narcotics importation scheme). Brennan v. Univ. of Kansas, 451 F.2d
1287 (10th Cir. 1971) (civil case for return of work product seized by Italian authori-
ties for a fellow researcher in search that was legal under Italian law but not U.S.
law); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968) (civil tax case in which
Philippine authorities seized evidence in violation of both the U.S. Constitution and
Philippine law-although this was a civil tax case, the court's opinion discusses the
use of this evidence in the context of criminal law); Brulav v. United States, 383 F.2d
345 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967) (illegal search of narcotics
smuggler by Mexican authorities); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.
1965) (illegal search of a suspect in a car theft ring by Mexican authorities).
158. Marzano, 537 F.2d at 270; see Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 743-46 (lengthy discus-
sion of several cases).
159. Id. at 270-71; see 405 F.2d at 745 (discussing Corngold v. United States, 367
F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966)); Morrow, 537 F.2d at 139 (exclusionary rule invoked if
foreign authorities are acting as agents for their U.S. counterparts), contra Birdsell,
346 F.2d at 782 (a Fifth Circuit case that was apparently rejected by a later Fifth
Circuit case-see 537 F.2d at 270-71 discussing Corngold).
160. Id. at 271. Although not stated as a holding in the other cases in note 157, in
each of the other cases, the court reports, as a fact, that U.S. authorities did not
request foreign authorities to search the suspect and his belongings, thus removing
the issue of whether the motive of the foreign authorities was to aid U.S. authorities.
See 537 F.2d at 270 (superintendent Trickier reached his own decisions about what to
do with the information the agents gave him); Controni, 527 F.2d at 712; Stonehill,
405 F.2d at 746; Brulay, 383 F.2d at 348; Birdsell, 346 F.2d at 782-83 (defendant,
who was unable to speak Spanish, was arrested by Mexican police while attempting
to pass himself off as a Mexican).
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a foreign government is not sufficient to be a participant in the acts
that a foreign government takes based on the information. The mere
presence of federal officials does not make them participants either.' 6'
The Court's fourth amendment exclusionary rule in cases involv-
ing illegal foreign searches is based on three propositions. First, the
fourth amendment is directed at federal and state officials, not foreign
officials.162  Second, the exclusionary rule is not mandated by the
fourth amendment. It is a prophylactic rule designed to deter fourth
amendment violations. 6  Third, foreign officials are unlikely to be
deterred by the exclusionary rule. 164 Thus, the rule only applies when
federal officials instigate the search or participate so substantially that
the search turns into a joint venture.'
The number of reported cases where the accused alleges that
foreign authorities violated his fifth amendment rights is quite
small.' " The general rule flowing from these cases is that evidence
obtained from involuntary statements must be suppressed.' 6 7
Miranda violations by foreign authorities, however, do not mandate
suppression unless U.S. authorities participate in the questioning
without giving the warnings.16
A different rationale supports the fifth amendment rule. The
fifth amendment directly states that no person "shall be compelled in
161. 537 F.2d at 270; 405 F.2d at 746; 346 F.2d at 782.
162. 527 F.2d at 712; 405 F.2d at 743; 383 F.2d at 348; 343 F.2d at 782.
163. 527 F.2d at 707; 405 F.2d at 743; 383 F.2d at 348.
164. Morrow, 537 F.2d at 139; 537 F.2d at 271 (quoting Brulay); 405 F.2d at 743;
383 F.2d at 348.
165. 537 F.2d at 139; 405 F.2d at 743, 745. A joint venture includes the situation
where U.S. officials request a search and the search would not have been undertaken
without the request. See the court's discussion of Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d
1 (9th Cir. 1966).
166. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (coerced confession elicited by
Canadian authorities); Kilday v. United States, 481 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1973) (bank
embezzlement suspect questioned by Argentina police without Miranda warnings
and with U.S. Consul serving as interpreter-statements admissible because test is
whether statements are coerced, not whether Miranda warnings are given); United
States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972) (suspect accused of possessing and
transporting stolen U.S. Treasury bill was questioned by Bahamian police in presence
of F.B.I. agent without being given Miranda warnings-test when foreign officials
do the questioning is voluntariness of statements, not whether Miranda warnings are
given. The purpose of Miranda is to deter improper interrogation. This purpose is not
served by requiring Miranda warnings before interrogation by foreign authorities);
Brulav v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
(1967) (test is voluntariness of statements).
167. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
168. United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211. 213 (2d Cir. 1972); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
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any criminal case to be a witness against himself."'' 61 Moreover,
unlike the fourth amendment, with its discussion of warrants, the fifth
amendment contains no language which hints that its prohibitions
apply only to actions of federal and state governments.
Two policies underlie the suppression of coerced foreign confes-
sions. First, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
1897, coerced confessions are suppressed because of their unreliabil-
ity. 70 Second, accepting coerced statements into evidence is, of itself,
a violation of the fifth amendment. 17' Based on these policy consider-
ations, suppression is mandated if a foreign government violates the
accused's fifth amendment rights. Whether foreign authorities were
acting as U.S. agents, or whether U.S. officials participated in the
investigation is not relevant.
The previous discussion suggests that a tax evader with standing
can suppress evidence obtained by foreign officials in response to a
request for assistance under a tax treaty if the foreign officials violate
the accused's fourth and fifth amendment rights in obtaining the
information. If the violation consists of an illegal search, suppression is
mandated because the purpose of the search is to aid the U.S. govern-
ment. The only exception to this result would be if the foreign govern-
ment conducts the search for reasons unrelated to the U.S. request. If
the violation is an illegal search violation, suppression must occur
because the search was instigated by the U.S. government when it
requested assistance under the treaty. Without exception, the illegal
search cases have held the evidence is admissible only when the search
is not conducted for U.S. purposes. If the violation is a violation of the
privilege against self incrimination, the evidence must always be sup-
pressed.
The previous paragraph, however, begs an important question.
Is it possible for an individual to be the victim of an illegal search in a
foreign jurisdiction under modern constitutional law? The United
States Supreme Court has stated that an illegal search consists of an
invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy.171 Can an individual
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a foreign jurisdiction
where he does not have the protection of the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights?
169. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170. Brain, 168 U.S. at 547.
171. Brulay, 383 F.2d at 349 n.5.
172. Payner, 447 U.S. at 731.
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If an expectation of privacy exists in books and records (the most
important type of privacy to a tax evader), it should be found in the
tax havens with their strict commercial secrecy laws. In the case of the
Bahamas, the United States Supreme Court has already held that the
secrecy law does not provide an expectation of privacy. The Court
found an expectation of privacy lacking because the Bahamian courts
can force the revelation of information. 73 In addition, the Court
stated (in dicta) that U.S. citizens do not have an expectation of
privacy in the Bahamas because U.S. law requires citizens to report
their relationships with foreign financial institutions. 174
Given the hesitancy of the courts to make it difficult to enforce
the tax laws, the courts may hold that a taxpayer has no expectation of
privacy overseas when the issue is actually litigated. Such a holding
would not dispose of the issue, because the courts would still have
jurisdiction under their general supervision powers and the due proc-
ess clause. The issues involved would change.1" Instead of asking
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy was violated, the courts
would engage in a balancing of interests. 176 With the high priority
that tax law enforcement receives in the courts, courts would proba-
bly allow the introduction of evidence obtained in a search that was
illegal under U.S. law if the search was not legal under foreign law.
Proving that a search was not legal under foreign law, of course,
would be a difficult task for the taxpayer.
D. Covert Operations
Covert operations include the use of informants, illegal searches,
bribery and theft. Former Treasury officials, as well as current offi-
cials, have admitted obtaining evidence in violation of both U.S. and
foreign criminal laws. 17 7 Some of these were highly successful. Oper-
ation Tradewinds, for example, resulted in audit deficiencies in forty-
five cases and several criminal prosecutions. 7 8 An offshoot of Opera-
173. Id. at 731-33.
174. Id. at 732 n.4.
175. See Stotzky and Swan, Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange
Treaties: Confronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 MINN. L. REV. 733 (1978).
176. Id. at 795.
177. Payner, 447 U.S. 733-34 n.5; Guttentag, Enforcing United States Tax Law
Where the Information or Taxpayer Is Overseas, 12 INT'L LAw. 609, 616 (1978);
OVERSIGHT HEARINGS INTO THE OPERATIONS OF THE IRS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (OPERATION TRADEWINDS, PROJ-
ECT HAVEN AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS TAX PROGRAM), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 115-16.
178. Id. at 155.
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tion Tradewinds, Project Haven, resulted in the recent case of United
States v. Payner.'7 9
In United States v. Payner, an I.R.S. informant learned that a
Bahamian bank official was planning a visit to Miami. 8 0 He knew
that the official would be carrying bank records and designed a
scheme to obtain access to them. This scheme was approved by his
I.R.S. control agent.""' The informant arranged a date for the offi-
cial with a former employee of his. The official left his briefcase in the
employee's apartment. While the couple was at dinner, the informant
entered the apartment using a key that the employee had provided
him for the occasion. 182 He removed the official's briefcase from the
apartment and gave it to the I.R.S. agent who photocopied the rec-
ords.1 3 The records were returned before the couple returned. 8 4
One of the documents in the briefcase provided the lead that ulti-
mately led to Payner's conviction.8 "
The district court recognized that Payner lacked standing to
suppress the documents under the fourth amendment, but exercised its
supervisory powers to suppress the evidence because it was tainted
with gross illegality. 8 6 The court of appeals affirmed. 187 The Su-
preme Court reversed, and held that "the supervisory power [did] not
authorize a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on
the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third party not before
the court." 88 There is, however, a fascinating footnote in the case.
In oral argument, the government reported that the I.R.S. had
"called off" Operation Tradewinds. 89 Furthermore,
The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that require agents
to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to report
known illegalities to a supervisory officer, who is in turn directed to
notify appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual Suppl. 9-21, §§
9373.3(3), 9373.4 (Dec. 27, 1977). Although these measures appear
on their face to be less positive than one might expect from an
179. 447 U.S. 727 (1980),
180. Id. at 730.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 730-31.
187. Id. at 731.
188. Id. at 735.
189. Id. at 733 n.5.
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agency charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disap-
proval of the practices found to have been implemented in this
case. We cannot assume that similar lawless conduct, if brought to
the attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with ap-
propriately. To require in addition the suppression of highly proba-
tive evidence in a trial against a third party would penalize society
unnecessarily. 190
This footnote may suggest that the Supreme Court will use its supervi-
sory powers to suppress evidence if the Agency, as an institution,
engages in future violations of U.S. law to gather evidence, even if the
party before the court is not the victim of the violation.
The Payner burglary was highly successful in terms of tax en-
forcement. Over 300 U.S. citizens and firms were identified as having
accounts with the bank. 1' Six dozen criminal cases were brought, as
well as numerous tax cases. 92 In view of this success, the I.R.S. can
be expected to continue its covert operations, although the incidents of
Payner type abuses should subside.
It is unlikely that illegal activity by I.R.S. informants will com-
pletely disappear. Although the I.R.S. now requires agents to instruct
informants on the law, there is no guarantee that an over zealous
informant will not violate a suspect's constitutional rights. If this
happens, what legal issues will appear at trial?
First, the issue of standing must be resolved.193  If the defend-
ant's rights have not been violated, and the illegal activity was not
solicited or approved by the I.R.S., Payner suggests that the evidence
will be admitted. Assuming standing is not involved, the question will
be similar to the one presented by the government's request for assist-
ance under the tax treaty. In fact, since the I.R.S. has used foreign
police officials as informants in the past, 194 a fact pattern may appear
in which the violator of a taxpayers rights is a foreign police official.
190. id. Although the Court does not mention it, the I.R.S. agent involved was
suspended for his actions. Guttentag, supra note 177, at 616.
191. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 116.
192. Id.
193. In United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 87 n.4 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court said that the issue of standing was not relevant. The issue was
whether a legitimate expectation of privacy had been invaded. If not, the defendant
could not suppress evidence. The practical effect is not different from the standing
doctrine. The defendant cannot suppress evidence seized from a third party in
violation of the fourth amendment.
194. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 4, at 114-15.
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Since the foreign official will not be acting in his official capacity,
however, the fact pattern will diverge from the pattern presented
when a foreign official violates the rights of a U.S. resident while
responding to an official U.S. request for assistance in tax enforcement
matters.
The end result should not change. Evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment by an I.R.S. informant should be suppressed if
the defendant has standing and the informant was serving as an agent
of the I.R.S. This rule is similar to the rule governing fourth amend-
ment violations by foreign officials. In addition, the rule is identical to
the rule governing searches and seizures by informants in domestic
criminal cases.','
Whether the informant is acting on his own or as an agent of the
government is a factual question. At one extreme an employer hires a
private detective to investigate an employee and then turns the prod-
ucts of a warrantless search over to the government. 96 The evidence
is admitted.19 7 At the other extreme, an airline employee would only
open a parcel at the request of the government. 9 8 The evidence is
suppressed because the search, in substance, becomes a government
search. 9 In the middle of the spectrum is an informant who had
received $375 for past information..20  Federal agents request that he
report suspicious parcels, but he takes it upon himself to open suit-
cases. 20 ' The evidence is admitted because he exceeded his instruc-
tions and because his previous contacts with the government were too
minimal(S375) to convert the search into a government search.20 2
195. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (private detective, working for
employer investigating an employee's fraud, conducted an illegal search-evidence
admissible because federal agents not informed of search until after it was over);
United States v. Bomengo, 580 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1978) (apartment engineer who
was also a former police informant and former police officer forced open an apart-
ment door while looking for a water leak and found two hand guns with silencers-
evidence admissible because entry was for non-official purposes); United States v.
Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1973) (paid informer for Customs Agents conducted an
illegal search of drug smugglers' suitcases-evidence admissible because informant's
contacts with customs agents were minimal and his instructions were to report
suspicious parcels, not search them); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1966) (airline employee opened a parcel at request of government agent-evidence
suppressed).
196. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. at 472-73.
197. Id. at 475-76.
198. Corngold, 367 F.2d at 5.
199. Id.
200. Valen, 479 F.2d at 469.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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In contrast to an illegal search and seizure, the rule for fifth
amendment violations is clearer. If coerced statements are inherently
unreliable, 20 3 and accepting coerced statements into evidence is itself a
fifth amendment violation,2 4 coerced statements should be sup-
pressed. Unlike the fourth amendment, case law does not appear to
inquire into the motives of the person violating the accused's fifth
amendment rights.
From the defendant's point of view, the main obstacle to exerting
his rights at trial may be discovering that his rights were violated.
Discovering a fifth amendment violation does not present a problem,
but some types of fourth amendment violations (a burglary with
photocopied documents that lead to other documents) may never be
discover ed.
III. SUMMARY
The I.R.S. faces several obstacles when tax evaders use interna-
tional tax havens to evade paying U.S. taxes or to conceal the source of
their income. By making use of commercial and bank secrecy laws,
the taxpayer can make it difficult for the government to use two of
their most powerful methods of proof: the net worth method and the
bank deposit expenditure method. Each of these methods can be
defeated by the taxpayer proving that he has acquired assets with
unsecured foreign loans. In fact, the loans are secured by deposits, but
the government may not be able to prove this in court because of bank
secrecy laws in the tax havens.
The I.R.S. has five methods of acquiring evidence for use in tax
trials: voluntary cooperation of the taxpayer, compulsory process,
search warrants, tax treaties and covert operations. Many tax evaders
are convicted because they cooperate voluntarily with the govern-
ment, not realizing the consequences of such cooperation. If the tax-
payer does not cooperate, the Service's task becomes more difficult.
Compulsory process consists of the I.R.S. summons, the grand
jury subpoena, and letter rogatory. Taxpayers with subsidiaries in
countries with commercial secrecy laws have attempted to defeat
summons and subpoenas on the grounds that to comply would subject
them to criminal or civil sanctions in the foreign jurisdiction. This
argument has enjoyed some success, but courts have found it unper-
suasive in recent years. Although serious due process questions are
203. Bram, 168 U.S. at 547.
204. Brulay, 383 F.2d at 349 n.5.
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involved, which recent decisions have ignored, the United States Su-
preme Court's hesitation to impede enforcement of the tax laws sug-
gests that record keepers with subsidiaries in foreign countries will be
forced to supply information even if the due process issue is squarely
faced. Present tax laws would be difficult, if not impossible to enforce,
if record keepers were excused from complying with compulsory proc-
ess because foreign legislation makes compliance a crime. Besides
abdicating national sovereignty, such a decision would create political
questions of the highest magnitude. The country would be faced with
deciding whether to reduce social spending or change to a system of
consumption based taxation. The Court is unlikely to place this issue
before the legislature.
The United States has tax treaties with several foreign countries,
but none with the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Caymans, and Panama,
all important tax havens. The treaties that exist have several limita-
tions and are of limited usefulness in producing information that is
admissible in court. The information is often not in a form that is
admissible. Even if in admissible form, there is a danger. Since U.S.
and foreign laws differ, foreign authorities may use methods to pro-
duce the evidence which complies with their law, but violates the
U.S. Constitution. If so, and if the accused has standing to object to
use of the evidence, case law suggests that the evidence would have to
be suppressed. Suppression would result because the U.S. govern-
ment, by requesting foreign assistance, instigated the violation.
Covert operations have resulted in several prosecutions. Some of
the operations, however, violated U.S. and foreign law. Case law
suggests that violations of fourth amendment rights by I.R.S. inform-
ants will result in suppression if the informant is serving as the agent
of the U.S. government. Evidence obtained by violating the taxpayer's
fifth amendment rights, however, will probably result in suppression.
Of course, these conclusions presume that the defendant knows his
rights have been violated. When the violation consists of a fifth
amendment violation, discovery of the violation presents no problem.
In contrast, certain types of fourth amendment violations are difficult
to detect and the taxpayer may never be aware that his rights have
been violated.
